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The articles of Walter (2013) and Stier
(2013) refer to some central problems
of philosophy regarding the concept of
disease. Among them are the questions
whether psychiatric diseases exist at all,
how they are to be distinguished from
mere problems of everyday life, which
underlying theoretical concept of disease is
assumed, and what kind of normativity—
if any—is associated with their definition.
In this commentary, I am going to com-
memorate the way medicine in general
identifies and defines diseases and kinds of
diseases, and the role theoretical concepts
like pathologicity and disease entity play in
medical epistemology and concept forma-
tion. The fundamental ideas and principles
of modern medical pathology (German:
Krankheitslehre) are the following ones:
1. Diseases are circumscribed, partial pro-
cesses and conditions of the life pro-
cess of human individuals as a whole.
They are not a necessary part of life,
i.e., a life without any disease or patho-
logical condition is theoretically possi-
ble. Processes and conditions that are
necessary, inevitable parts of life (e.g.,
developmental stages like childhood)
are, in themselves, never pathological
conditions (but of course they may be
pathologically altered).
2. Diseases are generally distinguished
from healthy, normal conditions inso-
far as they meet at least one disease
criterion (or criterion of pathologicity).
3. There are five primary criteria of
pathologicity:
(a) Shortening of lifetime expectancy,
or immediate lethality
(b) Pain, and other specific somatic or
vegetative complaints
(c) Infertility, i.e., inability of
biological reproduction
(d) Inability or impairment of living
together in human symbiotic
communities
(e) Non-universal disposition of the
organism to develop a condition
that is pathological according to
one or more of these criteria
(this clause covers also conditions
that are usually called risk/risk
factor, disability, impairment, or
handicap).
4. Diseases originate from circumscribed,
first or primal causes (or complexes
of first causes) that interact from the
outside (i.e., from the environment or
the parental generation) with the life
process of the individual.
5. All partial processes of a disease
are causally connected. Particularly
and retrospectively, they would have
occurred even without or against the
individual’s conscious, intentional
volition.
6. In medical theory, the entirety of pos-
sible pathological processes forms a
huge but definite, manageable system
of pathological conditions and causal
pathomechanisms that represents the
subject matter of General and Special
Pathology (including Pathophysiology
and Pathobiochemistry).
7. In medical theory, the entirety of dis-
eases may be systematized and classi-
fied according to their causal structure
and clinical features, and is classified
into species (kinds) of diseases that
are called disease entities and arranged
taxonomically by Nosology.
These seven principles represent core theo-
retical ideas of modern medicine. Around
these core ideas the entire existing medical
theory of diseases has developed in history
and can be reconstructed by philosophy1.
In the present context of theoretical
pathology several remarks may deserve
particular attention:
1. Criteria of pathologicity do not express
valuations or normative assessments,
but form criteria for the use of discrim-
inating and classifying conditions of life
and living organisms. Particularly, this
applies to conditions of pain and bodily
or vegetative complaints and discom-
fort: Indeed, these kinds of sensation
are experienced as negative, unpleas-
ant or even unbearable and insuffer-
able events, but their “negativity” is not
the result of a free, intentionally eligi-
ble evaluation, or of a socio-culturally
established norm or convention, but is
determined by nature (viz. the nature
of the human organism). It has devel-
oped and been selected in the course
of natural evolution and phylogene-
sis of the species homo sapiens. This
fact is not contradicted by a different
fact: that pain and discomfort of this
kind are, additionally, in most—but,
interestingly, not in all—cases of occur-
rence evaluated negative by the affected
1The account of theoretical pathology in this sec-
tion is a very condensed one. You will find far more
elaborated versions in Hucklenbroich (2013, 2014).
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individual, and are subsumed by the
socio-cultural environment under the
norm of being in need of treat-
ment. These evaluations and normative
assessments form an additional over-
determination of the natural, physi-
ologically determined sensations, and
they may, in distinction to the nat-
ural sensation, be denied (e.g., in
asceticism) or even inverted (e.g., in
self-punishment or self-mutilation).
2. The above principle 2 postulates a strict
dependence of pathologicity on criteria
1-5. But this principle is overwritten by
a theoretically more elaborate account
of pathology and nosology: There are
single instances of disease entities that
do not meet any primary criterion
of pathologicity. Nevertheless, they are
classified as diseases, because they meet
the defining criteria of the respective dis-
ease entity. These defining criteria may
be, e.g., definite changes in cell struc-
ture, or in composition of blood, that
can be ascertained by pure lab findings.
In such cases, theoretical classification
overrides and overwrites phenomeno-
logical classification. This procedure
that is common inmedicine shows that,
in principle, identification of diseases
and of pathologicity has “emancipated”
from the pure phenomenological level
and the level of pure clinical symptoms,
and will give priority to the theoretical
system in ambiguous cases.
Recent philosophical debates on the con-
cept of disease have been paralyzed by the
controversy between naturalism and nor-
mativism. Naturalism attributes this con-
cept to differences given in nature, while
normativism ascribes these differences to
individual or socio-cultural valuations and
preferences2. The reconstruction of medi-
cal theory of disease sketched above shows
this dichotomy and antagonism to be mis-
guided: In the first instance, the con-
ditions and circumstances addressed in
the criteria of pathologicity are naturally
given possibilities resulting from the struc-
ture and organization of human organ-
ism and its embedment into its natural
environment:
2This controversy, meantime, lasts about several
decades. For an overview and review see, e.g.,
Gottschalk-Mazouz (2008).
• mortality and lethal vulnerability are
determined by the very structure of
living organisms
• negative sensations like pain, nau-
sea, tussive irritation, pruritus (itching)
etc. belong to protective mechanisms
that are universal features of human
organisms
• ability of biological reproduction is nat-
urally (biologically) represented in the
male and female reproductive systems
consisting of specialized organs, hor-
mones, functions, and mental affections
• living together in (human) symbiotic
communities is prerequisite for survival
of every human individual, from birth
and maternal care to life-long coopera-
tion and mutual assistance.
The last feature, of living together, may be
realized in very different, culturally deter-
mined and historically changing ways.
This openness to variance shapes deeply
the form of symbiosis but does not sus-
pend the universal necessity of symbiosis
at all. Thus, criteria of pathologicity pos-
sess a foundation in nature and are not
constituted by valuations or social norms,
but by the natural, bio-psycho-social life-
form of homo sapiens. However, defend-
ing this position does not imply that one
is bound to deny, ignore, or underestimate
the cultural and historical embedding and
variability concerning forms of thinking
and social life dealing with phenomena
of disease. On the contrary: Cultural val-
ues and traditions as well as individual
convictions and preferences are decisive
regarding the way disease phenomena are
interpreted, evaluated, and regulated by
norms and institutions. Help and assis-
tance for ill persons, emergence of the
professional role of physician, and the
development of public health systems are
intentional and socio-cultural reactions to
the natural phenomenon of disease. In
this sense and in the final phenomenon,
disease—also, mental disease—is simul-
taneously determined by natural and by
socio-cultural factors. One-sided natural-
ism as well as one-sided normativism both
are misleading.
The article of Henrik Walter provides
an impressive account of the development
and actual status of biological psychiatry.
Only the status of the concept of dis-
ease remains somewhat ambiguous. First,
it is stated that the concept dysfunctional
“inevitably involves normative judgments”
(2). Later on, the concept of normativ-
ity is connected to the concepts of suf-
fering and of clinical relevance, and its
readability from “biological facts” or “bio-
logical measures” is denied (6). Finally,
Walter defines disorder, following Graham,
by being harmful and undesirable for the
subject but adds the remark that these
“normative criteria” are not dependent on
the subject’s appreciation (7)! Who, then,
is the subject of these norms and valua-
tions (appreciations), and where do their
objectivity or legitimacy stem from? If one
accepts the above solution regarding the
alleged dichotomy of naturalism and nor-
mativism, this apparent aporia may be
dissolved.
Marco Stier reports and discusses in
his article a lot of arguments from cur-
rent philosophical literature concerning
the status of mental diseases. In my opin-
ion, many of these arguments are in need
of a critical examination. But I want
to confine myself to an examination of
Marco’s first andmain thesis: That diagno-
sis of mental disorder is dependent on the
acceptance of socio-cultural norms and
values. Slightly reformulated, his proof
runs as follows:
1. Mental disorders are defined by the
presence of deviant behavior (experi-
ence, emotion) and/or of suffering.
2. Deviance can only be recognized by
comparing with (mental) normality.
3. Mental normality is defined by social
and cultural norms.
4. The same holds true for the con-
cepts of suffering and harm: What is
recognized to be suffering or harm
depends on socio-cultural norms and
values.
5. Therefore, the diagnosis of mental dis-
order is dependent on the prevalence
or acceptance of certain socio-cultural
norms, and is varying relative to socio-
cultural differences and changes.
Premise 1 is equivalent to the assump-
tion that behavioral deviance and suffering
are the decisive criteria of pathologicity in
psychiatry. I am going to show that this
premise is misguided in two respects, and
leads to an inadequate view of biological
psychiatry.
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1. As soon as psychiatry succeeds in clari-
fying the etiopathogenesis of a mental
disorder or disease regarding also its
biological aspects, diagnostics of this
disease no longer depends on behav-
ioral or mental criteria: Once pathog-
nomonic somatic markers or criteria of
a disease are recognized, diagnosis of
this disease may be secured or excluded
by purely biological tests and proce-
dures. To say more: If the disease in
question is a disposition—a disposi-
tional disease like “social phobia” or
“tendency to panic attacks” –, then it is
not even necessary that the patient at
hand has shown the respective symp-
toms (behavior) at all, because diagno-
sis may be ascertained beforehand, e.g.,
by lab findings. The same shift from
symptom-related diagnostics to biolog-
ically objectifiable methods is usual in
somatic medicine, and is in accordance
with the aforementioned principle that
theoretical classification overwrites and
overrides phenomenological criteria.
2. Behavioral deviance and suffering (or
harm) are not genuine criteria of patho-
logicity. Already in the pre-scientific
sense, there is no necessary or cogent
connection between deviance and
pathologicity. Instead, there may be
many different causes and reasons of
deviance, most of them without any
relationship to disease. Additionally,
deviance may be, but by no means is
bound to be a result of some diseases,
mental or somatic. Also, suffering and
harm, as rather abstract categories, are
not criteria of pathologicity, because
these concepts are far too broad und
undifferentiated. Rather, there are sev-
eral definite, specific kinds of suffering
that represent psychiatric criteria of
pathologicity. To mention just a few
examples:
• the overwhelming, flooding kind of
fear and angst that is typical for panic
attacks
• the “feeling of unfeelingness” in
major depression
• hallucinations, anhedonia (inability
to experience pleasure), feel-
ings of self-alienation and de-
personalization, and catatonia in
schizophrenics.
Symptoms of these kinds represent very
specific forms of experience that, indeed,
might be described as kinds of suffering,
but are criteria of diseases and diagnosis
only by their very special characteristics,
not because they are cases of abstract suf-
fering or harm. What is most important in
the present context: These specific forms
of experience and behavior are character-
ized by a very stable cultural invariance of
their appearance and presentation; they do
not vary relating to even very different cul-
tural contexts. This is a well-ascertained
insight of psychiatry, and it diametrally
contradicts the thesis of Marco Stier.
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